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This essay re-examines Kierkegaard’s view of  Socrates. I consider the problem that arises from 
Kierkegaard’s appeal to Socrates as an exemplar for irony. The problem is that he also appears 
to think that, as an exemplar for irony, Socrates cannot be represented. And part of  the 
problem is the paradox of  self-reference that immediately arises from trying to represent x as 
unrepresentable. On the solution I propose, Kierkegaard does not hold that, as an exemplar 
for irony, Socrates is in no way representable. Rather, he holds that, as an exemplar for irony, 
Socrates cannot be represented in a purely disinterested way. I show how, in The Concept of  
Irony, Kierkegaard makes use of  ‘limiting cases’ of  representation in order to bring Socrates 
into view as one who defies purely disinterested representation. I also show how this approach 
to Socrates connects up with Kierkegaard’s more general interest in the problem of  ethical 
exemplarity, where the problem is how ethical exemplars can be given as such, that is, in such a 
way that purely disinterested contemplation is not the appropriate response to them. 
 
 
 
Socrates … this puzzling, uncategorizable, 
inexplicable phenomenon (Nietzsche)   
 
 
A plausible general hypothesis about Kierkegaard is that he modelled his work as an 
author on Socrates. This supposition helps to explain many features of  his work: his self-
withdrawing and maieutic gestures, his focus on ethical self-knowledge, his eye for paradoxes, his 
animus against those he regarded as modern-day sophists, his professions of  ignorance.1 Further, 
                                                 
1 This hypothesis has long guided Kierkegaard studies, going back at least to David Swenson’s way of  
introducing Kierkegaard to Anglophone readers, in the 1940s, as a “Danish Socrates” (1983 [1941]). 
Hjördis Becker-Lindenthal writes, “Kierkegaard’s perception of  Socrates was decisive for his thoughts 
and methodology alike” (2014, 259). Critical studies that develop this hypothesis also include Daise 1999; 
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the hypothesis finds ample support in Kierkegaard’s own self-assessments, not least a late text 
that invokes Socrates as the “only analogy” for his own life’s work (KW XXIII, 341).2 And his 
writings generally abound with references to Socrates, often via a metonym such as, “the simple 
wise man” (e.g. KW XVII, 241).  
A second well-attested hypothesis about Kierkegaard is that he understood Socrates, first 
and foremost, as an ironist.3 This understanding of  Socrates is worked out in detail already in 
Kierkegaard’s magister dissertation, On the Concept of  Irony with Continual Reference to Socrates. Part 
One of  this work purports to show that his being an ironist is not only a possible interpretation 
of  Socrates but that he actually was so and even, in a world-historical perspective, had to be. 
Later, in Concluding Unscientific Postscript, the figure of  Socrates as ironist will play a leading role as 
counterpoint to the Hegelian speculative philosophers who, allegedly lacking any sense of  irony, 
confuse themselves with God. And another metonym by which Kierkegaard invokes Socrates is, 
“the greatest master of  irony” (JP 2: 1554).4   
Plausible though they are, these two hypotheses lead quickly to an interpretative 
difficulty. For, the evidence which supports them gives us prima facie reasons to affirm both of  
the following: 
 
(A) Kierkegaard holds that Socrates can serve as an exemplar for irony; and 
(B) Kierkegaard holds that, as an exemplar for irony, Socrates cannot be represented. 
 
Thesis A is already supported by the evidence that Kierkegaard modelled his work as an author 
on Socrates, whom he understood as an ironist. For, how could this be so if  he did not hold that 
Socrates can serve as an exemplar for irony? As we shall see, there is strong further evidence 
already in The Concept of  Irony that he holds that Socrates can and should serve as an exemplar for 
irony, not just for Kierkegaard as an author but also for his readers, assuming only on their part 
an interest in living a “properly human life” (KW II, 326). As we shall also see, this text provides 
                                                                                                                                                        
Cooper 1985; Howland 2008; Kirmmse 2001; McCombs 2013; Mjaaland 2007; Mooney 2007; Muench 
2009a; 2009b; Sinnett 2000. 
2 The reference is to Kierkegaard’s Writings, edited and translated by Howard V. Hong and Edna H. Hong et 
al., 26 volumes. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1978-2000. Citations to this series are to “KW” 
followed by Volume and page numbers.  
3 While critics disagree about the details, there is broad consensus that, in Kierkegaard’s view of  Socrates, 
irony is the bottom line. See e. g. Kofman (1998); Harrison (1994, Ch. 2); Lippitt (2000); Martinez (2001); 
Muench (1999a); Pattison (2002; 2007); Rubenstein (2001); Söderquist (2013); Strawser (1997).    
4 The reference is to Kierkegaard’s Journals and Papers, edited and translated by Howard V. Hong and Edna 
H. Hong, 7 volumes. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1967-78. Citations to this series are to “JP” 
followed by Volume and page numbers. 
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prima facie evidence for Thesis B, given the way it develops the idea of  Socrates as an ironist, that 
is, as one to whom it belongs never to appear in propria persona. In Kierkegaard’s image, trying to 
represent an exemplar for irony, so conceived, is like trying to draw something that becomes 
invisible as soon as it appears (KW II, 3).  
The difficulty is that these two theses, A and B, appear to be in some tension. For it may 
be natural to suppose that if  X can serve as an exemplar for F, then X can be represented as an 
exemplar for X.  Even if  we hold to the view, sometimes attributed to Wittgenstein, that, while 
in use, the standard meter in Paris was the one thing that could not be measured as the length of  
a meter, we should still agree that nothing could serve as the standard meter were it not capable 
of  being represented as such, in writing and in speech.5 And even if  we deny that all exemplars 
are exemplars for F, where F is some particular property or feature, we should agree that some 
things serve as exemplars for F and that these things can be represented as such.6 If  a given 
colour swatch is to serve as an exemplar for magenta, for example, then it will need to be 
represented as such. Such representation need not be anything mental: it need not be for 
example a mental image of  magenta. But for a given swatch to serve as an exemplar for magenta 
it will need to be represented as such in some way: by its position relative to other shades in a 
sample, perhaps, or by having the word “magenta” written beneath it. Or, to switch to an 
example of  a sort that will be closer to our main concerns in this paper: I could not take another 
person as an exemplar of  courage, say, or temperance were I to lack any way of  representing him 
or her as such.    
So it may be difficult to see how Kierkegaard could hold both that Socrates can serve as 
an exemplar for irony and that he cannot be represented as such.  My aim in this paper is to 
resolve this difficulty, the problem of  Kierkegaard’s Socrates.7 The central issue is whether and in 
                                                 
5 See Wittgenstein 1953, §50. Gert 2002 argues compellingly that, contrary to a traditional reading, the 
view that the standard meter in Paris cannot intelligibly be described as being the length of  a meter is not 
one that Wittgenstein actually endorses in his later work. 
6 In The Brown Book, Wittgenstein gives an example which might illustrate the idea of  an exemplar that is 
not an exemplar for F, where F is some particular property or feature. In this example, someone remarks 
of  a piece of  soap that it has a particular smell. To the question, “which smell?” they can only respond, 
“this smell” or “the smell it has”. Wittgenstein observes that these latter, reflexive locutions may tempt us 
to assimilate this case with ones in which the term “particular” is used transitively, in place of  a 
description (as in, “this soap has a particular smell, the smell of  ground-ivy leaves”). But Wittgenstein 
insists that “particular”, in such contexts, might instead be used intransitively: not to stand in for any 
description but to emphasize or express one’s attention directly to the soap. See Wittgenstein 1958, 158. 
Thanks to Matteo Falomi for drawing my attention to this passage in this connection. 
7 Kierkegaard’s work gives rise to other instances of  this form of  problem. For example, there is a parallel 
problem of  Kierkegaard’s Abraham, in which the difficulty is the impression that Kierkegaard thinks 
Abraham can and should serve as an exemplar for faith but also that, since nothing could count as 
empirical evidence of  it, Abraham’s faith cannot be represented by any description of  his actual 
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what way Kierkegaard thinks that, as an exemplar for irony, Socrates defies representation. I shall 
argue that the apparent evidence for Thesis B is in fact evidence for the following, significantly 
qualified, version of  this thesis: 
 
(B*) Kierkegaard holds that, as an exemplar for irony, Socrates cannot be represented in a 
purely disinterested way. 
  
As we shall see, the notion of  disinterestedness emerges in Kierkegaard’s work as a mode of  
attention and representation that is appropriate to a wide, but limited, range of  possible objects. 
The proper objects of  disinterestedness are, namely, those that do not essentially bear on 
existential questions, that is, on questions regarding how to live and who to become. I shall argue 
that Kierkegaard relies on the possibility that Socrates can be represented as an exemplar for 
irony, albeit not in a purely disinterested way. Focusing on The Concept of  Irony, I shall show how 
this text makes use of  special sorts of  representations that, by disturbing the attitude of  
disinterestedness, are designed to help make possible ways of  emulating Socrates that are not 
based on any purely disinterested representation of  his life.   
 My plan is as follows. I shall first review the evidence in The Concept of  Irony for Thesis B, 
i. e. the evidence that Kierkegaard thinks that Socrates cannot be represented as an exemplar for 
irony. I shall argue that there is no coherent reading of  this text that supports this unqualified 
thesis. Secondly, I shall introduce in a general way how the idea of  disinterestedness enters into 
Kierkegaard’s thought and why he doubts the suitability of  purely disinterested representations 
to represent ethical exemplars. Finally, I shall argue that The Concept of  Irony deploys certain 
“limiting cases” of  disinterested representation that are designed to help make possible ways of  
emulating Socrates that are not based on any purely disinterested contemplation of  his life.    
 
I 
 
Kierkegaard introduces Part One of  his dissertation by citing two widely recognized 
difficulties for any attempt to represent the historical Socrates and then adding to these a third, 
hypothetical, difficulty. The two familiar difficulties are that (i) Socrates himself  left no written 
                                                                                                                                                        
behaviour. For a radical approach to this problem, which grasps the nettle that Kierkegaard’s real view 
must be that Abraham cannot serve as an exemplar for faith, see Kosch 2008. For a critical perspective on 
this interpretation of  Fear and Trembling, see Watts 2011. 
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record and that (ii) his contemporaries found him puzzling, if  not baffling, and left us with 
portraits of  his life that are (to put it cautiously) difficult to reconcile. Let me briefly rehearse the 
second of  these familiar difficulties (I take it that the first needs no comment).  
That Socrates’s contemporaries found him puzzling is amply attested in Plato’s dialogues. 
We need only recall Alcibiades’ reference to Socrates’s “bizarreness” (tēn sēn atopian) (Symposium 
215a3); or the remark given to Phaedrus about Socrates being atopotatos, “the oddest of  men” 
(Phaedrus 230c); or again what Socrates is himself  given to say when he says, “I am utterly 
disturbing (atopos) and I create only perplexity (aporia)” (Theaetetus 149a). But the issue is not only 
internal to Plato. From the historical point of  view, the difficulty is that, vivid though they each 
are, the three major first-hand portraits of  Socrates we have – from Xenophon and Aristophanes 
as well as Plato – diverge to the point of  making it hard to see how they can be representations 
of  one and the same person. Xenophon’s seemingly conventional moralist, for example, is 
difficult to reconcile both with Plato’s aporetic stingray (see Meno 79e7-80b7) and with 
Aristophanes’ scurrilous purveyor of  head-in-the-clouds “wisdom” (see The Clouds).  
The hypothetical difficulty that Kierkegaard adds to these familiar ones is that Socrates 
lived in such a way as to maintain a discrepancy between his outward appearance and his inner 
life. On this hypothesis, Socrates is a man of  masks, where “it is of  the nature of  irony never to 
unmask itself ” (KW II, 48). At first blush, we might hope that this hypothesis is suitable to ease 
our difficulties by helping to explain the divergence between the first-hand accounts we have of  
Socrates’s life. For, if  indeed it belongs to Socrates to conceal himself  behind different masks, 
different public personae, then we might well expect his witnesses to recall different impressions 
of  his life. And indeed Kierkegaard will proceed to defend his hypothesis (inter alia) on just these 
grounds. At the outset, however, he clearly flags up a way in which the hypothesis that Socrates 
was an out-and-out ironist, where this means one who never appears in propria persona, only 
brings with it a new difficulty and one of  a quite different order.  
This new difficulty – call it the paradox of  the radical ironist – can be introduced as follows. 
If, by definition, the radical ironist “is always only making himself  seem to be other than he 
actually is” (256) then he cannot be represented as he actually is; but in that case, he cannot be 
represented as one who never appears as he actually is. Paradoxically, it appears to follow from 
the supposition that Socrates is a radical ironist he cannot be represented as such. Kierkegaard is 
clearly aware of  this paradox. To bring it out, he offers the analogy of  trying to draw the 
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mythical nisse in the cap that makes him invisible (3).8 This is an apt image for Kierkegaard’s 
paradoxical project in the first part of  his dissertation: to defend his hypothesis by revealing 
Socrates as one whose nature is always to remain concealed.   
We may observe that the root of  the problem here is the paradox of  self-reference that 
arises immediately from any attempt to represent Socrates’s true nature as beyond the limits of  
manifestation and so, a fortiori, beyond the limits of  representation. The general form of  this 
problem arises whenever we find a claim advanced of  the form, X is unrepresentable (or 
inexpressible, indescribable, etc.). The problem is that any such claim appears to be either self-
refuting or unintelligible. It will be self-refuting in the case that the place-holder, “X”, can be 
filled in by something representable (or expressible etc.). It will be unintelligible, or an empty 
schema, in the case that it can be filled in by nothing representable (or expressible etc.). In the 
gloss that Graham Priest puts on predicaments of  this sort, we have “a totality (of  all things 
expressible, describable etc.) and an appropriate operation that generates an object that is both 
within and without the totality” (2001, 3).9   
As Priest also illustrates, in the face of  this sort of  predicament, some thinkers (including 
Priest himself) are lead to logically unorthodox conclusions. Noticing that even to say that God 
is inexpressible is to express something about God, Nicholas of  Cusa, for example, was 
apparently prepared to conclude that God’s nature both is and is not expressible, in a univocal 
sense of  “expression” (2001, 22-23). In principle, we could envisage Kierkegaard as saying, or 
trying to say, something similar about Socrates: that his ironical nature both can and cannot be 
represented (in a univocal sense of  “representation”). But he does not say this and I do not think 
it would be a plausible reading of  his dissertation. How, then, does he set out to resolve the 
paradox of  the radical ironist?  
Kierkegaard adopts a strategy that is more often associated with theologians who 
confront paradoxes of  divine transcendence. This is the via negationis, the way of  negation (see 
KW II, 198). Here is Aquinas’ canonical formulation of  the stratagem:  
 
But we cannot know what God is, only what he is not. We must therefore consider the 
ways in which God does not exist, rather than the ways in which he does. (I.3 proem, 
1910) 
                                                 
8 Compare the references in Concluding Unscientific Postscript to the paradoxical task of  trying to paint mars 
in the armor that makes him invisible (KW XII, 79; 174). 
9 I have elsewhere considered Kierkegaard’s response to this form of  paradox with respect to the 
presentation of  Christianity worked out in Philosophical Fragments and Postscript. See Watts 2016.  
10 Translated by Brian Davies (Aquinas 2006, 28). 
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In parallel fashion, Kierkegaard’s ostensible procedure is to specify ways the historical Socrates is 
not adequately represented in Plato, nor in Xenophon, nor in Aristophanes. And he purports to 
infer from these merely negative results that the hypothesis that Socrates was a radical ironist 
must be true. I say that Kierkegaard purports to argue in this way because I think the strategy 
signally fails to work, as a solution to the paradox of  the radical ironist, and that he knows this 
full well.   
As Kierkegaard presents it, his procedure involves a sort of  “triangulation” between 
Plato’s idealized view, Xenophon’s prosaic view, and Aristophanes’ satirical view (KW II, 19). 
The suggestion here is not that these three portraits are equally valid. On the contrary, 
Kierkegaard makes no secret of  his view for example that, compared with Xenophon’s, Plato’s 
portrayal is by far the more authoritative. His argument, rather, is that it is only on the hypothesis 
that he was a radical ironist that we can explain how Socrates could be a point of  departure for 
Plato’s philosophy in just the way he was and be misunderstood by Xenophon in the way he was 
and be satirized by Aristophanes in the way he was. Kierkegaard does, however, express an 
overall preference: remarkably, it is for Aristophanes' literary caricature of  Socrates in The Clouds 
(152). (I shall offer a suggestion about the significance of  this preference in §III below.)  
On the face of  it, then, Kierkegaard supposes that, although it cannot be represented in a 
positive and direct way, Socrates’s ironical nature can nonetheless be represented in an indirect 
and negative way. Early on in The Concept of  Irony, Kierkegaard alights on a suggestive image in 
this connection. “There is a work”, he writes, “that represents Napoleon's grave. Two tall trees 
shade the grave … as the eye follows the outline, suddenly Napoleon himself  emerges from this 
nothing” (19). Likewise, Kierkegaard purports to proceed purely negatively and indirectly, by 
arranging the portraits of  Plato, Xenophon and Aristophanes in such a way that the real Socrates 
can emerge to fill the empty space, as it were, between them. 
But there is a glaring problem with the way Kierkegaard purports to bring Socrates to 
light purely via negationis. This becomes plain on a moment’s reflection on the analogy with the 
picture of  Napoleon’s grave. For, it is not, of  course, by magic that Napoleon emerges from “the 
nothing” between the two trees depicted. Plainly, the trick works only because the artist has 
drawn the outline of  these trees with a positive image of  Napoleon already in mind. Likewise, we 
may suspect that Kierkegaard’s critical discussion of  Plato’s, Xenophon’s and Aristophanes’ 
portraits of  Socrates is guided from the outset by a positive view of  what belongs to Socrates: 
namely, the hypothesis that his was the life of  a radical ironist. Drawing to a close his via 
negationis, Kierkegaard admits as much:  
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During this whole investigation, I have continually had something in mind, namely, the 
final view [sc. the view of  Socrates as an ironist], without thereby laying myself  open to 
the charge of  … having hidden, sought, and then found what I myself  had found long 
ago. (155) 
 
Kierkegaard here anticipates the objection that his method of  triangulation has been far from 
innocent, having been guided from the outset by a positive view of  Socrates. His response is to 
concede that his approach to the source material has been guided by his hypothesis, but to deny 
that there is anything pernicious about this. His reply, in effect, is that the hermeneutic circle is 
inescapable: “this can scarcely be otherwise, since the whole is prior to the parts” (156). There 
can be no such thing, Kierkegaard insists, as a purely innocent, presuppositionless, ground-up 
interpretation. Now, on its own terms, this reply looks reasonable enough. But the problem is 
this. If  Kierkegaard’s method is supposed to bring Socrates into view purely via negationis, the 
concession that his procedure has been guided from the outset by a positive view of  Socrates is 
nothing short of  disastrous. For it amounts to the concession that he has failed to show that, if  
Socrates cannot be positively represented, he can nonetheless be brought into view in a purely 
negative way. 
One interpretative possibility here is that Kierkegaard has failed to notice this implication 
of  his concession that his approach has been guided from the outset by a positive view of  
Socrates. A more sympathetic interpretation, and I think a far more plausible one, is that his 
purported attempt to bring Socrates into view purely via negationis is an example of  Kierkegaard’s 
own irony.11 But, if  so, where does this leave us regarding his view of  Socrates? Are we to 
suppose that his portrait of  Socrates qua radical ironist simply self-destructs, leaving us with no 
serious claims to consider? Sarah Kofman, who rightly draws attention to the possibility of  
Kierkegaard's own irony in this connection, appears to think that this is indeed where The Concept 
of  Irony leaves us: with no positive claims about Socrates whatsoever. Kofman writes: 
 
[I]f  Kierkegaard ends up, where Socrates is concerned, having contributed nothing but 
the gift of  the viewpoint of  irony, a gift that is in no way positive, a gift that is a negative 
                                                 
11 Something of  a smoking gun in this regard is a journal entry in which, reflecting on his dissertation, 
Kierkegaard comments, “if  something should be found, particularly in the first part of  the dissertation, 
that one is generally not accustomed to come across in scholarly writings, the reader must forgive my 
jocundity” (KW II, 441). To this remark, Kierkegaard adds for good measure the information that “I, in 
order to lighten the burden, sometimes sing at my work” (idem).    
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conception, at least he will have shown that it is possible to get around the Hegelian 
dialectics without appearing to touch it. (1998, 216)  
 
It is hard to know where these remarks leave us. They seem to keep in play the idea that 
Kierkegaard somehow manages, after all, to pull off  a purely negative representation of  Socrates 
and Socratic irony. Or perhaps Kofman’s view is that, once we see through Kierkegaard’s own 
irony, we will be left with nothing but the thought that Socrates is unrepresentable. But this 
thought only takes us back to the core paradox: on pain of  self-contradiction, Socrates cannot be 
represented as unrepresentable.12 
From these considerations, I think we may draw the negative conclusion that The Concept 
of  Irony does not support ascribing to Kierkegaard the view that Socrates’s nature as an ironist 
cannot be represented at all or that it cannot be represented in any positive way. In the remainder 
of  this paper, I shall work towards an alternative reading of  the use he makes of  his negative 
representation of  Socrates as a radical ironist. I hope to show how his use of  this representation 
is intelligible as part of  Kierkegaard’s aim to reintroduce Socrates as an ethical exemplar. 
 
II 
 
 At one point in his dissertation, Kierkegaard remarks: 
 
[I]t is obvious that Socrates was in conflict with the view of  the state – indeed, that from the 
viewpoint of  the state his offensive had to be considered most dangerous, as an attempt to 
suck its blood and reduce it to a shadow. Moreover, it is also clear that he would unavoidably 
draw official attention to himself, because it was not a scholarly still life to which he was 
devoting himself. (KW II, 178) 
 
In his own milieu, Kierkegaard might well have expected this imagery of  blood-sucking, and the 
observation that Socrates’s life was no “scholarly still life”, to strike a dissonant note. In his 
lectures on the history of  philosophy, Hegel had portrayed the life of  Socrates as a necessary and 
beautifully formed moment in world-history, a life marked by just the kind of  harmonious 
                                                 
12 It is especially difficult to see how, on Kofman’s reading, Kierkegaard’s portrayal of  Socrates can have 
any anti-Hegelian purchase. For, Hegel clearly recognizes the sort of  problem of  self-referential 
incoherence at issue here; indeed, this sort of  problem is at the heart of  Hegel’s criticism of  Kant’s 
appeal to unknowable noumena. See for example Hegel 1991[1830], §60.  
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plasticity that characterizes the classical artwork itself  (1995 [1805-6]). I shall not take up here the 
issue of  his complicated relations to Hegel circa 1840.13 But we shall see that, in Kierkegaard's 
portrayal, Socrates comes out by contrast as aesthetically disturbing, even grotesque. 
Now, the image of  a “scholarly still life” is an early marker of  a theme that returns in 
Kierkegaard’s mature work. On a line of  thought made most explicit by his fictional philosopher, 
Johannes Climacus, certain objects of  human attention – centrally including the productions of  
poetry and the fine arts – can be distinguished by their aptness to sustain disinterested 
contemplation. Alluding to Kant’s third Critique, for example, Climacus remarks: 
 
Poetry and art have been called an anticipation of  the eternal. If  one wants to call them 
that, one must nevertheless be aware that poetry and art are not essentially related to an 
existing person, since the contemplation of  poetry and art, “joy over the beautiful,” is 
disinterested, and the observer is contemplatively outside himself  qua existing person 
(KW XII, 313n). 
 
Not least under the influence of  Kant, the association between the aesthetic as such and 
disinterestedness had become widely accepted in Kierkegaard’s milieu.14 Climacus’s take on this 
association, in terms of  one’s being ‘contemplatively outside of  oneself  qua existing person’, is 
nicely captured also in the following from Joyce’s Portrait of  An Artist as a Young Man: 
 
The feelings excited by improper art are kinetic, desire or loathing. Desire urges us to 
possess, to go to something; loathing urges us to abandon, to go from something. These 
are kinetic emotions. The arts which excite them, pornographical or didactic, are 
therefore improper arts. The esthetic emotion (I use the general term) is therefore static. 
The mind is arrested and raised above desire and loathing. (Joyce 2012 [1916]: 197) 
   
In the view I think Joyce’s artist shares with Climacus, art proper allows the observer to be 
“raised above desire and loathing”. But we should enter two caveats here. Firstly, the relevant 
idea of  disinterestedness is not to be conflated with the idea of  the non-sensuous. Given the 
root of  “aesthetic” in aesthesis, it would approach an oxymoron to describe “the aesthetic 
emotion” as non-sensuous. This emotion is said to be “static”, I take it, not because it does not 
                                                 
13 I have addressed the question of  the early Kierkegaard’s response to Hegel’s Socrates in Watts 2010. 
14 For an historical overview, see Kreitman 2006.  
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excite the senses but because it does not excite our practical interests.15 (This is surely why in this 
connection Joyce’s artist can place the pornographic in the same class as the didactic.16) Secondly, 
the idea of  disinterestedness is also not to be conflated with the idea of  one’s being uninterested 
or emotionally detached. To describe “the aesthetic emotion” as disinterested is not to deny that 
it is an emotion. Following Kant, in Climacus’s view, the contrast is instead with any form of  
attention that directly engages one’s interests as a temporally situated practical agent. 
Some maintain that disinterestedness is the preserve of  the aesthetic, narrowly construed 
in terms of  the appreciation of  art. While he agrees that it is “the highest pathos” in aesthetics 
(KW XII, 328), Climacus conceives of  disinterestedness in a broader way: not as restricted to the 
gallery or concert hall but as the mode of  attention that befits any subject-matter that does not 
essentially bear on existential questions, that is, questions concerning how to live and who to 
become. Thus, Climacus refers in the same breath to “the aesthetic” and “the intellectual”, as 
general modes of  human attention, defining both as disinterested: “the aesthetic and the 
intellectual are disinterested” (266-267). In this view, disinterestedness is closely associated with 
the ideal of  objectivity and is the mode of  attention required by studies in logic, for example, or 
metaphysics, no less than art criticism.17 
As it emerges in Kierkegaard’s writings, then, the idea of  disinterestedness describes a 
mode of  human attention that is appropriate for a wide domain of  possible objects. But it is also 
characteristic of  these writings to introduce in this connection an immediate note of  caution and 
warning. At one point in Either / Or, for example, Kierkegaard’s fictional “ethicist” admonishes 
himself  not to get “carried away into the aesthetic-intellectual intoxication” in which he thinks 
his young friend, the aesthete, lives (KW IV, 16). Likewise, in Postscript, Climacus argues at length 
that, while there are important domains in which disinterestedness is perfectly fitting, a 
dangerous fantasy is involved in any posture in which this attitude is adopted wholesale, as a 
general outlook.18 As a temporally situated individual with a constitutive concern for one’s own 
                                                 
15 A nice counterpoint to the example of  pornography as improper art is provided by the remarkable 
discussion of  Mozart’s Don Giovanni in Either / Or, as a perfect aesthetic expression of  “the sensuous”, a 
paragon of  “the musical-erotic” (see KW III Vol. 1, 45ff). 
16 In the terms used by Kierkegaard’s aesthete in Either / Or, we could make the same point by saying that 
the aesthetic pathos is ecstatic; that is, it transports us outside the temporal structure of  our practical 
agency (see “Either / Or: An Ecstatic Lecture” in KW III Vol. 1, 38ff).  
17 This is not to say that Kierkegaard’s writings fail to recognize a distinction between aesthetics and, for 
example, metaphysics (on the contrary, this distinction is made explicitly: see e. g. KW III Vol. 1, 150). 
Rather, we should think of  metaphysics, like aesthetics in the narrower sense, as sub-divisions within the 
sphere of  disinterestedness, the sphere of  the ‘aesthetic-intellectual’.  
18 Climacus’s worry has antecedents in The Concept of  Irony. In the background of  this text, and the critical 
focus of  its second part, is the ideal of  a global aesthetic outlook, as celebrated in the writings of  the Jena 
romantics and associated with certain kinds of  irony. Thus, in the course of  his critique of  Schlegel’s 
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existence, Climacus insists that it is impossible for a human being to fully inhabit the sphere of  
the aesthetic-intellectual. To try to do so, he thinks, could only lead to a kind of  performative 
contradiction in which agents try to exercise their practical agency by evading the very conditions 
of  such agency.19 
These general worries about the dangers of  losing oneself  in disinterested contemplation 
find a particular focus in Kierkegaard’s treatment of  the problem of  ethical exemplification. The 
problem is how it can be possible for a person to serve as an exemplar for an ethical ideal.20 A 
central context for Kierkegaard’s interest in this issue is no doubt the tradition of  imitatio Christi, 
where the problem is how Christ, “the God-Man”, could possibly serve as a prototype for us.21 
But Kierkegaard also problematizes the issue of  ethical exemplarity in a more general way, not 
least regarding what is involved in properly representing an ethical exemplar as such. A major 
part of  this general problem is the risk of  turning a putative exemplar into an object of  mere 
admiration. Thus, Climacus: 
 
One would think that, by telling the reader that this person and that person actually have 
done this and that (something great and remarkable), one would place the reader closer to 
wanting to do the same, to wanting to exist in the same, than by merely presenting it as 
possible. [However,] the fact that this person and that person actually have done this and 
that can just as well have a delaying as a motivating effect. The reader merely transforms 
the person who is being discussed (aided by his being an actual person) into the rare 
exception; he admires him and says: But I am too insignificant to do anything like that. 
Now, admiration can be very legitimate with respect to differences, but it is a total 
misunderstanding with regard to the universal. (KW XII, 358) 
 
                                                                                                                                                        
Lucinde, Kierkegaard writes: “Who would be so inhuman as not to be able to enjoy the free play of  
fantasy, but that does not imply that all of  life should be abandoned to imaginative intuition. When 
fantasy alone gains the upper hand in this way, it exhausts and anaesthetizes the soul, robs it of  all moral 
tension, makes life a dream” (KW II, 292 fn). While part of  the worry here is evidently an ethical one, 
there is also arguably an internal dimension to Kierkegaard’s critique of  the Romantics in this regard: viz. 
the worry that if  everything is aesthetic then nothing really is. Indeed, the very word “anaesthetizes” in 
the passage just cited contains the idea of  that which is antithetical to the aesthetic (thanks to Oisin 
Keohane for drawing my attention to this word in this regard).  
19 For the argument that disinterestedness leads “at its maximum” to a performative contradiction, see 
KW XII, 193-194. See also my “Kierkegaard on Truth: One or Many?”, forthcoming in Mind. 
20 The “ethical” in “ethical exemplar” here should be understood in the broad sense of  that which 
pertains to human flourishing and the human good. My use of  this term therefore does not discriminate 
between ethical and religious exemplars. (Compare Kierkegaard’s use of  such locutions as, “ethical or 
ethical-religious” (e.g. KW XII, 198)). 
21 See especially KW XX, Section VI. 
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This passage reflects Climacus’s view that, in order for an ethical exemplar to function as such, 
the exemplar must serve to represent an ethical possibility for me, a way I could become. And he 
evidently thinks that this tells against any attempt to represent ethical exemplars, in writing or in 
speech, in the modality of  actuality, by describing how the exemplary other has actually lived, 
what noble deeds he or she has actually performed and so forth. For, the worry is then that, far 
from serving to represent an ethical possibility for me, a way I could become just in virtue of  
being human, the putative exemplar will become for me (at best) merely an object of  my 
admiration, an exceptional individual.  
 Climacus here gives us a reason to reject a certain picture of  what is involved in 
representing an ethical exemplar. On this picture – we might call it the Blueprint Model – the 
first step is to represent the ideal as actually instantiated in the exemplar’s behaviour. Using this 
representation as a standard, others can then try to live up to the ideal by copying the relevant 
features of  the exemplary behaviour. Put in these terms, Climacus’s worry is that, if  we try to 
implement this model, we will never get beyond the first step since, even if  we manage to latch 
onto the right ones from among the myriad features instantiated by any given slice of  behaviour, 
we will become transfixed in contemplation of  these features.22 The problem is then how it can 
be possible to represent, as such, a determinate ethical possibility in which agents have a live 
interest, one they could take up for themselves, open to them just in virtue of  being human. 
  This problem is not just the worry that admiration is not the right way to relate to an 
ethical exemplar as such. There has been some debate among the critics about just how strongly 
Kierkegaard censures admiration in this regard. 23 On one view, he thinks that relating to ethical 
exemplars in a spirit of  admiration could only be a form of  moral evasion. Others argue that, 
while he is alive to this danger, we need not attribute to him a blanket prohibition on admiration 
in this context. Notably, both sides of  this debate take it for granted that ethical exemplars can 
be given as such: the question at issue is how we should relate to them. In my view, however, the 
deeper problem is how in the first place ethical exemplars can be given as such: that is, how they 
can be given so that disinterested contemplation is not the appropriate response to them. For, it is 
difficult to see why contemplation and admiration should not be fitting responses to moral 
                                                 
22 Compare the picture of  what is involved in the exemplification of  rules that has been the target of  
critical discussion in the literature after Wittgenstein and Kripke on rule-following: the rule-follower first 
grasps one of  the myriad rules instantiated in a finite set of  examples which he or she then tries to follow. 
For a discussion, see my 2012. 
23 With special reference to Fear and Trembling, and the idea of  Abraham as an exemplar of  faith, 
contributions to this debate include Conway 2002; Cross 1994; Lippitt 2000; Lippitt 2003. A propos 
Kierkegaard’s worries about admiration in the context of  his critique of  “Christian art”, see also Gregor 
2009; Kaftański 2016.  
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heroes represented as those whose deeds instantiate praiseworthy ideals. Since any such “still 
life” portrait of  the moral hero will invite and sustain disinterestedness, the deeper worry is that 
it will be unfit to represent an ethical exemplar as such.  
 Now, from the perspective of  traditional virtue ethics, there may appear to be a ready 
way to diffuse these concerns. This is simply the idea that the successful functioning of  ethical 
exemplars is relative to an audience. If  a given person has been brought up well – in Aristotle’s 
terms, if  the person is at least familiar with “the that” of  just and noble action if  not also “the 
because” – then he or she will be appropriately attuned to further ethical teaching, including the 
teaching that involves the representation of  exemplars (see Nichomachean Ethics 1095b2-13). In 
this perspective, an audience in which there has been formed over time “a kinship with virtue” 
(1179b30) will already be disposed to respond to represented exemplars not in a stance of  
disinterestedness but in a spirit of  appropriate ethical sensitivity and interest.24  
   With this Aristotelian tradition in mind, it is notable that Kierkegaard’s interest in the 
problem of  ethical exemplarity has an historical dimension and involves a certain critique of  
modernity. On this critique, modern cultures display a systemic tendency away from any ethos of  
shared ideals and towards an orientation that is hyper-reflective, distanced, disengaged. In short, 
modern cultures tend pervasively towards the aesthetic-intellectual. On the memorable image 
developed in Two Ages, the default orientation of  a modern culture, towards its heroes and ideals, 
is like the admiring audience of  a highly controlled display of  skillful ice skating. This audience is 
made up of  those who, “with the air of  connoisseurs”, pride themselves on their ability to 
discern the folly of  anything involving any real daring (KW XIV, 72). For them, what in an 
earlier age might have been an “inspired venture” now gets transformed into an “acrobatic 
stunt” (idem). Such is the background against which Kierkegaard aims to reintroduce ethical 
exemplars as such. A journal entry indicates the centrality of  this aim for his work in general:  
 
With the aid of  mediocrity's cheap dishonesty, Christendom has managed to lose the 
prototypes completely. We need to reintroduce the prototypes, make them recognizable, 
something that can be done only by: Either/Or. Either you have quality in common, or you 
are on another qualitative level – but not this ‘also – well, not quite, but nevertheless – also.’ 
(JP 2, 299)  
 
                                                 
24 For a seminal discussion of  this dimension of  Aristotle’s ethics, see Burnyeat 1980. 
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In pursuing this aim, the aim to “reintroduce the prototypes”, Kierkegaard evidently takes it that 
he may not presuppose in his audience the ability to recognize ethical exemplars as such. 
It is beyond my scope in this paper to provide a full account of  Kierkegaard’s approach 
to the problem of  ethical exemplification. But I believe that his early portrayal of  Socrates needs 
to be understood as responsive to the problem of  how to represent “the greatest master of  
irony” as an ethical exemplar, not least with a view to avoiding the pitfall of  rendering Socrates 
merely an object of  disinterested contemplation. Let me return, then, to The Concept of  Irony and 
to the way this text takes up the problem of  ethical exemplification. 
 
III 
 
The fifteenth, and final, formal thesis of  Kierkegaard’s dissertation runs: “Just as 
philosophy begins with doubt, so also a life that may be called human begins with irony” (KW II, 
6). In his Conclusion, Kierkegaard proceeds to defend the claim that “no properly human life is 
possible without irony” (326). He defends this claim on the grounds that, without irony, we are 
liable to vacillate between two ways of  falling short of  living a properly human life. Without 
irony, that is, we are liable to vacillate between a sort of  restless absorption “in finitude” – in 
hum-drum worldly affairs – and, on the other hand, a self-forgetful preoccupation with abstract, 
impersonal questions of  “science and scholarship” (idem). Inasmuch as these twin dangers are 
especially characteristic of  modern life, Kierkegaard suggests that the need to recover a sense for 
irony is for us especially pressing.25  
How then are we to benefit from the humanizing effects of  irony? Against the 
background also of  his critique of  modern, Romantic irony, advanced in Part Two of  his 
dissertation, the overall shape of  Kierkegaard’s answer seems clear. We need to go back to 
Socrates and recover, for ourselves and for our own time, a sense for the kind of  irony he first 
exemplified in an archetypal way.26  
Plausibly, then, Kierkegaard’s dissertation is fundamentally shaped by the aim to 
reintroduce Socrates as an ethical exemplar. And this aim is in turn shaped by Kierkegaard’s 
dissatisfaction with what he regarded as a tendency in his own day to aestheticize Socrates and 
                                                 
25 For a forceful defence of  the ethical value of  irony, with continual reference to Kierkegaard, see Lear 
2003.  
26 “Concepts”, Kierkegaard declares in his Introduction, “just like individuals, have their history and are 
no more able than they to resist the dominion of  time, but in and through it all they nevertheless harbor a 
kind of  homesickness for the place of  their birth.” (KW II, 9) Accordingly, we are to see how the concept 
of  irony needs to be traced back to its place of  birth, in the life of  Socrates. 
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the concept of  irony, as symptomized both by Hegel’s account of  the beautiful life of  Socrates 
and by the aesthetic types of  irony celebrated by the Jena Romantics. In its aim to reintroduce 
Socrates in this context, The Concept of  Irony answers the call of  J. G. Hamann’s Socratic 
Memorabilia, a text that was surely formative for the early Kierkegaard. Hamann writes: 
 
[T]here is an idol in the temple of  learning which bears beneath its image the inscription, 
“The History of  Philosophy,” and which has not lacked for high priests …[who] have 
provided us with … masterpieces which might have been very much admired and sought 
after by learned connoisseurs of  the arts, but on the other hand were secretly ridiculed by 
sensible people as fantastic growths and chimeras or were even imitated for the sake of  
whiling away the time, and in theatrical drawings. [What we need is someone who will] 
show us, instead of  the paintings of  philosophers or their decoratively mutilated busts, 
quite different creatures, and would imitate their customs and wise sayings, their didactic 
and heroic legends, in colours that would be more life-like. (Hamann 1967 [1759], 145-
146)  
 
Hamann’s talk of  the “decoratively mutilated busts” and “theatrical drawings” of  standard 
histories of  philosophy, offered as if  only for learned connoisseurs of  the arts, reverberates in 
Kierkegaard’s claim that it was no “scholarly still life” to which Socrates devoted himself. And 
Hamann’s call for an alternative sort of  representation, such as one might actually live by, also 
finds its echo in Kierkegaard’s dissertation. “[I]f  our generation has any task at all”, he declares 
in his Conclusion, “it must be to translate the achievement of  scientific scholarship into personal 
life, to appropriate it personally” (KW II, 328).27  
How, then, is Kierkegaard’s dissertation shaped by the aim to reintroduce Socrates as an 
ethical exemplar? We can begin to answer this question by underlining a striking, albeit often 
unremarked, feature of  this text. This is its tendency to defeat our expectations of  a scholarly 
dissertation.28 We might naturally expect a scholarly discussion of  a great philosopher to focus 
                                                 
27 Compare Climacus: “If  in our day thinking had not become something strange, something second-
hand, thinkers would indeed make a totally different impression on people, as was the case in Greece, 
where a thinker was also an ardent existing person impassioned by his thinking” (KW XII, 308)  
28 In his journals, Kierkegaard draws attention to the stylistic idiosyncrasy of  his dissertation: “The ease 
of  style will be censured. One or another half-educated Hegelian robber will say that the subjective is too 
prominent. First of  all, I will ask him not to plague me with a rehash of  this new wisdom that I already 
regard as old … [and reply] that one cannot write about a negative concept except in this way; and I ask 
him, instead of  continually giving assurances that doubt is overcome, irony conquered, to permit it to 
speak for once” (KW II, 440-441). We may add that even the list of  theses Kierkegaard chalks up at the 
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on the thinker’s major doctrines, theories, conceptual innovations and the like. But it is one of  
the negative results of  Kierkegaard’s examination of  the source material that what belongs to 
Socrates cannot be specified merely by reference to doctrines, theories and the like. This is not to 
deny that Socrates’s thought can be partially represented by, for instance, the doctrine that it is 
better to be harmed than to harm. What Kierkegaard denies, rather, is that any such 
representation of  the discursive contents of  his thoughts and beliefs, however extensive, could 
be adequate to capture what essentially belongs to Socrates.29 (There is a plausible contrast here 
with what essentially belongs, say, to Quine.)  
 Now, representations of  doctrines, theories and the like are, paradigmatically, apt to 
sustain disinterested contemplation. But it is a feature of  The Concept of  Irony that its 
representations of  Socrates often work to disturb any such attitude. Witness for example the 
following, being something of  a purple passage:   
 
Just as there is sometimes something deterring about irony, it likewise has something 
extraordinarily seductive and fascinating. Its masquerading and mysteriousness … holds 
one prisoner in inextricable bonds… In this manner, there quietly develops in the 
individual [who has encountered irony] the disease that … allows the individual to feel 
best when he is closest to disintegration. The ironist is the vampire who has sucked the 
blood of  the lover and while doing so has fanned him cool, lulled him to sleep, and 
tormented him with troubled dreams. (49) 
 
In these few lines, Kierkegaard conjures a host of  familiar vampire motifs: viz. that which is 
mesmerizing, seductive, predatory, disintegrating, impotent, repressed, bloodless, dream-like, 
ambiguous, ambivalent. The Concept of  Irony associates with Socrates three vampire-like qualities 
in particular. First, he elicits ambivalence in those who encounter him. Sensing that his self-
presentations serve ultimately to conceal, his interlocutors typically find themselves, like 
Alcibiades, seduced into trying to detect the essence behind the appearance. But, ex hypothesi, the 
ironist never allows this desire to be satisfied, never fully discloses himself. Second, in his 
singular ability to detect aporias in his fellow Athenians’ grasp of  familiar ethical concepts, 
                                                                                                                                                        
beginning of  his dissertation, as per the formal requirements of  the degree for which it was submitted, 
are scarcely conventional qua scholarly theses (KW II, 4).  
29 This negative claim about Socrates is, I believe, at the heart of  the early Kierkegaard’s critical response 
to Hegel’s portrait of  Socrates as a would-be systematic philosopher. Thus, he complains that what is 
most wrong about Hegel’s view is that it “does not accurately adhere to the direction of  the trend in 
Socrates’ life” (KW II, 235). On this, see Watts 2010.     
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Socrates drains the life-blood from the established ethical order. And third, rather as a vampire is 
neither exactly dead nor alive, Socrates is neither fully present in public life nor entirely absent 
from it. As an ironist, he never straightforwardly identifies himself  with any particular persona but 
neither does he simply withdraw from public life. For, he must appear to others in certain ways 
in order to maintain ironic distance between his public personae and his inner life.  
The Socrates-as-vampire motif  is no passing fancy in Kierkegaard’s dissertation. On the 
contrary, this text turns out to be awash with imagery that approaches horror. To mention two 
further examples: Socrates is the ferryman who “took people across from the fullness of  life to 
the shadowy land of  the underworld” (236); and Socrates leaves his victims suspended like 
Mohammed’s coffin which, according to a European fable, since it was found unacceptable to 
both heaven and earth had to be suspended between the two by a magnet (48). 
It is, then, a striking feature of  the way Kierkegaard depicts Socrates in his dissertation 
that he makes liberal use of  horror imagery. And we may note in general the way such imagery 
disturbs the attitude of  disinterested contemplation. In his seminal work on the philosophy of  
horror, Noël Carroll argues that the kind of  repulsion we feel when confronted with monstrous 
phenomena – detached but moving body parts, werewolves, zombies, vampires and the like – is a 
response to that which violates our settled categories of  thought. Carroll writes: 
 
That the works of  horror are in some sense both attractive and repulsive is essential to 
an understanding of  the genre. … With great frequency [horror narratives] revolve 
around proving, disclosing, discovering, and confirming the existence of  something that 
is impossible, something that defies standing conceptual schemes … If  what is of  
primary importance about horrific creatures is their very impossibility vis-à-vis our 
conceptual categories is what makes them function so compellingly in dramas of  
discovery and confirmation, then their disclosure, insofar as they are categorical 
violations, will be attached to some sense of  disturbance, distress, and disgust. (Carroll 
1990, 160) 
 
Now, I take it that it does not follow from Carroll’s analysis that works of  horror are “improper 
art” in the sense in which Joyce's artist thinks of  pornography and didactic stories as improper 
art. Horror imagery is not wholly inimical to disinterestedness: rather, it disturbs this attitude, so 
to speak, from within. Horror images both invite but also, in a particular way, repel an aesthetic-
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intellectual stance: by confronting us with “categorical violations”, they fascinate us and grip our 
attention while also making us recoil in “disturbance, distress, and disgust”. 30 
Using a geometrical analogy, we might think of  works of  horror in this regard as 
‘limiting cases’ of  disinterested representation. That is, on analogy with the way that parabolas 
and circles are limiting cases of  the ellipse, for example, works of  horror might be situated at the 
limits of  what can qualify as disinterested representation. On this conception, if  still life 
paintings, say, or classical busts are paradigm cases of  that which lies within the sphere of  the 
aesthetic-intellectual, works of  horror lie at the boundary of  this sphere. By volatizing our 
standard schemes of  disinterested representation, pushing these to their limits, works of  horror 
explore the limits of  such representation and bring them into relief.31  
 My suggestion, then, is that Kierkegaard’s use of  horror imagery attests to his aim to 
represent Socrates in ways that also represent limits to the sphere of  disinterestedness. The 
preference he expresses for Aristophanes' caricature of  Socrates points, I think, in the same 
direction.32 For, the art of  caricature may be regarded as another limiting case of  disinterested 
representation. Consider in this connection the way that, unlike a realistic portrait which is self-
effacing with respect to what it portrays, a caricature represents by distorting its subject-matter, 
making play of  its status as a picture and producing a comic effect. From this perspective, 
Kierkegaard’s preference for Aristophanes’ satirical portrait attests to his view that Socrates can 
be represented as an ironist, but only by representations that draw attention to their own status 
as such and begin to disturb the attitude of  contemplation. 
 This suggestion also illuminates Kierkegaard’s own ironical pursuit of  a via negationis 
towards Socrates, as one who, in Carroll’s phrase, ‘defies standing conceptual schemes’.33 For, 
again, the portrait that Kierkegaard produces by this means can be regarded as a limiting case of  
disinterested representation. In this perspective, Kierkegaard’s portrayal of  Socrates, which 
                                                 
30 In this regard, horror manifests some of  the features of  the Kantian sublime. When experiencing 
phenomena such as overhanging cliffs, thunderclouds, volcanoes and hurricanes, Kant thinks we 
experience “a movement of  the mind” which “may be compared to a vibration, i.e. to a rapidly 
alternating repulsion from and attraction to one and the same object” (Kant 2000 [1790], 141). 
31 Compare the discussion, in Stages on Life’s Way, of  Shakespeare’s Hamlet as a work that pushes the genre 
of  tragedy to its limits in the way it borders on the religious (KW XI, 452ff).  
32 Number VII of  Kierkegaard’s formal list of  theses has it that “Aristophanes has come very close to the 
truth in his depiction of  Socrates” (KW II, 4). On Kierkegaard’s interest in literary caricatures more 
generally, see Watts 2016. 
33 The idea of  phenomena that disrupt standing conceptual schemes is already indicated in the very first 
lines of  Kierkegaard’s dissertation which figures philosophers as “knights of  the Idea” who ride out to 
seize hold of  elusive phenomena. In this chivalric adventure, Kierkegaard observes, “one sometimes hears 
too much the jingling of  spurs and the voice of  the master” (KW II, 9).  
 20
presses the idea of  an ironist to the point of  paradox, is designed to draw attention to its own 
limits qua disinterested portrayal.  
Now, all of  this is liable to leave some readers of  Kierkegaard impatient, if  not 
exasperated. For, what could be gained by any approach to the historical Socrates other than one 
that tries, so far as possible, to provide a perspicuous, objective, disinterested account of  his life 
and thought? This sort of  challenge is in my view an important one, having deep roots in certain 
ways of  being committed to the ideals of  truthfulness and clarity. But I submit that the challenge 
can be answered in a convincing way by the following considerations. 
Firstly, though they are undeniably creative, Kierkegaard's representations of  Socrates by 
no means float free from constraints of  historical fidelity. They are not, in Kofman’s titular 
phrase, mere “fictions of  a philosopher”. On the contrary, Kierkegaard works hard to ground his 
approach to Socrates in the historical resources at his disposal. And, for all the playfulness of  his 
via negationis, he offers sober reasons – clear, well-grounded, conscientious reasons – for thinking 
that, since what belongs to Socrates cannot be specified by reference to doctrines, theories and 
the like, his life and thought requires a different approach.34 Likewise, he gives us genuine 
reasons, based on his close readings of  the source material, to dispute any account of  Socratic 
irony merely as a trope or conversational ruse, meant to trick others into have their views 
refuted.35 Thus, Kierkegaard’s own use of  irony by no means entails that his portrayal of  
Socrates is without serious intent, so much hot air. (Climacus will acerbically remark that that the 
presence of  irony excludes earnestness is assumed only by “assistant professors”! (KW XII, 
277))  
But secondly—and this is the point I want to emphasize here—Kierkegaard’s approach 
needs also to be understood against the background of  his aim to reintroduce Socrates as an 
ethical exemplar. Consider again the Blueprint Model we introduced above. On this model, to 
recall, one takes the behaviour of  another as a blueprint, where this behaviour is represented as 
such as to actually instantiate an ethical ideal. For the reasons Kierkegaard gives in his 
dissertation, this model is especially problematic if  we try to apply it to the case of  Socrates, as 
one who left no written record and who inspired portraits that are difficult to reconcile but 
which together attest, on any account, to his elusiveness. However, we are now in a position to 
                                                 
34 We may note in this connection a striking observation that Kierkegaard made in his papers, reflecting 
on his dissertation: “I have worked on this dissertation in fear and trembling”, he writes, “lest my dialectic 
swallow up too much” (KW II, 440). 
35 As I have argued in Watts 2010, Kierkegaard gives us compelling reasons to reject, for example, Richard 
Robinson’s identification of  Socratic irony with the “Socratic slyness” which consists in deceptively 
subjecting the views of  others to elenctic examination (Robinson 1971, 80).  
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see how The Concept of  Irony may apply a different model of  ethical exemplification. On this 
alternative model, the aim is to represent the exemplar in a way that, while sufficiently 
determinate to make salient a concrete ethical possibility, also works to disrupt disinterestedness. 
Such representations can be designed to help make possible a process of  “appropriation”, in 
which a person takes up for herself  the ethical possibility they serve to make salient.  
Conceived in this way, Kierkegaard’s approach relies on the possibility of  an alternative 
to the Blueprint Model that can also be distinguished from the view that representations of  
ethical exemplars are entirely devoid of  ethical content. On this latter, more extreme view, all 
ethical exemplars are, as such, on a par: there can be no way of  discriminating an exemplar for 
irony from an exemplar for courage, say, or temperance or patience.36 By contrast, on the 
interpretation I am proposing, Kierkegaard holds that the irony for which Socrates can serve as 
an exemplar is a determinate ethical possibility, distinct from other ethical possibilities. Crucially, 
however, this is not to concede to the Blueprint Model that the determinacy of  the ethical 
possibilities for which others can serve as exemplars can be represented in the modality of  
actuality and grasped in a purely disinterested way.  
It is also salutary that, on this interpretation of  Kierkegaard, relating to an ethical 
exemplar as such is no mere matter of  behaviour, no mere matter of  stimulus-response, but 
involves thinking. It follows that, in Kierkegaard’s view, thinking cannot be purely a matter of  
disinterested contemplation. And, indeed, on the conception of  “the existing thinker”we find 
worked out in Postscript, and associated there above all with Socrates, there is a kind of  thinking 
that is not purely disinterested. This is the thinking that Climacus describes in terms of  “double-
reflection”, in which one’s thinking about the universally human is always disciplined by 
reflection on the limits of  the aesthetic-intellectual and by reflecting back on the question of  
how one concretely stands in relation to the objects of  one’s thoughts. Plausibly, it is part of  
Kierkegaard’s aim, already in his dissertation, to make room for a kind of  thinking about 
Socrates that is disciplined in these ways.37 
Two major questions remain about Kierkegaard’s model of  ethical exemplification. 
Firstly, what exactly is the role therein for what I have called “limiting cases” of  disinterested 
representation? And secondly, how on this model are we to understand the process of  taking up 
                                                 
36 Certain lines in Nietzsche appear to lead in this direction of  an account of  ethical exemplars in which 
their role is purely formal, such as in no wise to communicate determinate ethical possibilities but merely 
to bring to awareness one’s own repressed knowledge of  one’s “higher self ”. For a development of  
Nietzsche’s thought in this direction, see Conant 2000, especially p. 206ff. 
37 On the notion of  double-reflection, see especially KW XII, 73; 87; 629-30. For a fuller account of  this 
notion see Watts 2013 and Watts 2016.  
 22
the challenge presented by an ethical exemplar, i. e. the process of  “appropriation”? While I shall 
not attempt here a full answer to these questions, I offer the following remarks in closing. 
I have suggested that, in his approach to Socrates, Kierkegaard aims to disturb the 
attitude of  contemplation and to do so from within, by deploying limiting cases of  disinterested 
representation. I have not claimed, however, that such representations are by themselves 
supposed to be sufficient to impel us to take up Socrates as an ethical exemplar. That hardly 
seems likely. While Kierkegaard’s Socrates-as-vampire motif  may help to disturb the attitude of  
contemplation it is surely not going to somehow catapult us into ethical appropriation.38 Rather, 
I submit, the function of  such imagery is to help to bring into relief  the sphere of  
disinterestedness as a limited domain, by pointing both to what lies within and to what lies 
outside of  this limit (on analogy with the way that e. g. a parabola points both to that which is 
and that which is not an ellipse).39 So conceived, such representations can plausibly play a 
valuable, albeit restricted role, by bringing to our attention just how we are oriented towards a 
matter when we are oriented to it in a purely disinterested way. Plausibly, such attention is an 
important part of  what is involved in the doubly-reflected thinking of  “the existing thinker”.  
Turning to what Climacus will call “the pathos of  appropriation” (KW XII, 609), one 
thing is clear: in Kierkegaard’s conception, appropriation is no mere matter of  copying.40 To 
appropriate an ethical exemplar is not to try to mimic some actual piece of  behaviour. As 
Kierkegaard presents it in the Conclusion to his dissertation, taking up Socrates as an exemplar 
for irony will instead mean trying to find one’s own way, for one’s own context, to counteract the 
twin dangers he outlines: the tendency to lose oneself  either in quotidian affairs or in 
abstractions. In this, Kierkegaard evidently thinks that a confrontation with Socrates can help us, 
                                                 
38 Compare Mooney: “If  the aim of  Kierkegaard’s and Climacus’s writing is to effect a change in selves, 
then good writing, direct and indirect, can minister or pave the way, but it cannot deliver the goods” 
(Mooney 1997, 146). While I am in sympathy with Mooney on this point, my interest here is on the 
problem of  how it can even be possible for writing – especially writing about Socrates – to “pave the 
way” for lived ethical appropriation. 
39 Compare Kant’s discussion, in his Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysics, of  the difference between two 
general conceptions of  a limit: as limitation and as boundary. Using examples of  limiting cases, Kant 
argues that, by contrast with the merely negative notion of  a limitation – as in for example the limited 
capacity of  a container – a boundary has a positive character by virtue of  sharing features both with 
entities within the domain it bounds and also with what lies beyond (see Kant 2004 [1783], 104ff).  
40 Compare Plato’s contrast between a human craftsman who models his own production on a temporal 
paradigm and the divine Demiurge who looks to the eternal paradigm (see Timaeus 28a6-b2). Arguably, 
part of  Plato’s contrast here is that the eternal paradigm could not be the sort of  model that the 
Demiurge works from by copying it (see Broadie 2011, 69-70). In Kierkegaard’s view, ethical appropriation 
perhaps requires us – as beings who exist in temporal-eternal synthesis – to be more like Plato’s divine 
Demiurge in this regard, less like the producer who makes copies from material things.  
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by functioning for us as an unsettling challenge, apt to disturb both the worldliness of  our 
mundane involvements and the unworldliness of  our purely aesthetic-intellectual pursuits. 
I think we may therefore attribute to Kierkegaard the view that, for an ethical exemplar 
to function as such, it needs to be treated not as a blueprint, to be copied, but as a determinately 
unsettling challenge, to be confronted.41 More no doubt needs to be said to make this contrast 
precise. But the following analogy, drawn from the sphere of  aesthetics, may help to bring it out.   
Consider the artist who confronts the ideas inscribed in her art-historical tradition and 
renders these ideas anew in her own work. Picasso, for example, is known to have made over two 
hundred variations in different media of  Manet’s Le Déjeuner Sur l’herbe, a work which itself  
radically challenged the tradition by (inter alia) discovering new possibilities latent in an etching 
of  Raphael’s drawing, The Judgement of  Paris, which in turn appropriates a relief  sculpture found 
on two ancient Roman sarcophagi. Upon viewing the Manet for the third time, Picasso is said to 
have written on the back of  an envelope: “When I see Manet’s Le Déjeuner sur l’herbe I say to 
myself: trouble for later on!” (cited in Cowling & Goldring 1994, 37). There is no question here 
of  mere copying. Picasso regards his artistic tradition not as a fixed actuality, to be simply 
continued or broken with, but as an unsettling challenge, one he is fated to keep on retrieving.  
 Kierkegaard, I submit, thinks that Socrates can function for us as an ethical exemplar in 
an analogous way: as an unsettling challenge to be confronted, and confronted again, for one’s 
own time and context.  
 
IV 
 
In conclusion, let me return to the difficulty with which I began, the problem of  
Kierkegaard’s Socrates. The difficulty is how to make sense of  Kierkegaard’s apparent view that 
Socrates can serve as an exemplar for irony but that he cannot be represented as such. With 
reference to The Concept of  Irony, I have argued that the prima facie evidence therein that 
Kierkegaard holds that Socrates cannot be represented as an exemplar for irony is best construed 
as evidence for the significantly qualified thesis: 
 
B* Kierkegaard holds that, as an exemplar for irony, Socrates cannot be represented in a purely 
disinterested way. 
 
                                                 
41 As Climacus puts it, “The thinker must present the human ideal … as an ethical requirement, as a 
challenge to the recipient to exist in it” (KW XII, 1.358). 
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We have seen that Kierkegaard is well aware of  the self-referential incoherence of  any attempt to 
represent Socrates as unrepresentable simpliciter. But, on the reading we have developed, he 
nonetheless deploys the paradox of  the radical ironist for a particular purpose: in order to 
represent Socrates in a way that disturbs disinterestedness and draws attention to the limits of  
disinterested representation. With reference also to his use of  horror imagery and his express 
preference for Aristophanes’ satirical portrayal of  Socrates, I have tried to bring out 
Kierkegaard’s special interest in ‘limiting cases’ of  disinterested representation, as ways of  
bringing into relief  the limited domain of  the aesthetic-intellectual as such. 
 We have seen that Kierkegaard’s approach in this regard is grounded both in 
considerations that are unique to the case of  Socrates and in general considerations about ethical 
exemplification. Jointly, these considerations allow us to conclude that, far from being at odds 
with his view that Socrates can serve as an exemplar, his view that Socrates’s irony is not apt to 
be represented in a purely disinterested way is an important part of  Kierkegaard’s conception of  
what it means properly to represent Socrates as an ethical exemplar. Kierkegaard holds that 
Socrates can be represented as an exemplar for irony, albeit not without disturbing the attitude of  
disinterested contemplation. And he holds that certain representations of  Socrates can help to 
make it possible for us to appropriate for ourselves the ethical value of  Socratic irony, though 
this will be quite unlike following a blueprint. 
As I hope to have made plausible, his very insistence that Socrates’s life was no “scholarly 
still life” reflects Kierkegaard’s aim to bring into view “the master of  irony”, not as a mere object 
of  contemplation but as an ethical exemplar. But one may harbour a lingering worry. For, have I 
not in this paper represented Kierkegaard’s portrayal of  Socrates in a merely disinterested way? 
But is it not true that, in taking Socrates for his model, Kierkegaard aimed to ensure that his own 
work defies any such representation? While it has not been part of  my aim here to represent 
anything as an ethical exemplar, I do not deny the force of  this worry. The truth it reveals is that 
scholarly articles, such as the present one, could never substitute for an engagement with primary 
texts of  the sort Kierkegaard has bequeathed us, texts whose own aims are always more than 
merely scholarly.42  
 
 
                                                 
42 For helpful discussion of  the ideas in this paper, warm thanks to David Batho, Matteo Falomi, Steve 
Gormley, Béatrice Han-Pile, David McNeill, Irene McMullin, Vasilis Politis and Jonathan Wood. Thanks 
also to the participants at various seminars in Dublin, Dundee, London and Essex and to the anonymous 
readers for this journal for their comments on a previous version.  
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